Designing a project at Arcitech, our clients get all necessary support and resources to keep their Technology simplified and impartial. When can you trust an expert to provide honest advice? At architech we are not tied to any brands in fact we don't sell anything, we only offer a service to our clients.
We design all systems based on what you want and need. Recommendation where an expert helps a decision maker choose among two actions that each benefit the expert and an outside option that does not. For instance, a salesperson recommends one of two products to a customer who may purchase nothing. Behavior is largely consistent with predictions from the cheap talk literature. For sufficient symmetry, recommendations are persuasive in that they benefit the expert by lowering the chance that the decision maker takes the outside option. If the expert is known to be biased toward either action, such as a salesperson receiving a higher commission on one product, the decision maker partially discounts a recommendation for it and is more likely to take the outside option. If the bias is uncertain, then biased experts lie even more, while unbiased experts follow a political correctness strategy of pushing the opposite action so as to be more persuasive. Even if the expert is known to be unbiased, when the decision maker already favors an action the expert panders toward it, and the decision maker partially discount the recommendation. The comparative static predictions hold with any degree of lying aversion up to pure cheap talk, and most subjects exhibit some limited lying aversion. The results highlight that transparency of expert incentives can improve communication, but need not ensure unbiased advice.
Designing a project at Arcitech, our clients get all necessary support and resources to keep their Technology simplified and impartial. When can you trust an expert to provide honest advice? At architech we are not tied to any brands in fact we don't sell anything, we only offer a service to our clients.
We design all systems based on what you want and need. Recommendation where an expert helps a decision maker choose among two actions that each benefit the expert and an outside option that does not. For instance, a salesperson recommends one of two products to a customer who may purchase nothing. Behavior is largely consistent with predictions from the cheap talk literature. For sufficient symmetry, recommendations are persuasive in that they benefit the expert by lowering the chance that the decision maker takes the outside option. If the expert is known to be biased toward either action, such as a salesperson receiving a higher commission on one product, the decision maker partially discounts a recommendation for it and is more likely to take the outside option. If the bias is uncertain, then biased experts lie even more, while unbiased experts follow a political correctness strategy of pushing the opposite action so as to be more persuasive. Even if the expert is known to be unbiased, when the decision maker already favors an action the expert panders toward it, and the decision maker partially discount the recommendation. The comparative static predictions hold with any degree of lying aversion up to pure cheap talk, and most subjects exhibit some limited lying aversion. The results highlight that transparency of expert incentives can improve communication, but need not ensure unbiased advice.